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iABSTRACT
Safe operation is a central objective for high-risk industries such as nuclear power 
plants. Operation of the plant is managed from a central control room, which is 
a complex socio-technical system of physical and organisational structures such 
as operators, procedures, routines, and operator interfaces. When control room 
systems are built or modi" ed it is of great importance that the new design supports 
safe operation, something that must be evaluated during the development process. 
Summative evaluations at the end of the development process are common in 
the nuclear power domain, whereas formative evaluations early in the process are 
not as customary. # e purpose of this licentiate thesis was to identify demands on 
evaluation methods for them to be suitable for early assessment of the control room 
system’s ability to support safe operation. # e research consisted of two parts: to 
explore evaluation measures relevant for nuclear power plant control room systems, 
and to identify requirements on evaluation methods for them to be useful in early 
stages of the development process. 
To explore the issue of evaluation measures two interview studies were performed 
with various professionals within the nuclear power domain. # e purpose of the " rst 
study was to investigate aspects contributing to safe operation, while the second study 
sought to identify design trends in future control room systems and their potential 
usability problems. To complement these empirical studies, other researchers’ choices 
of measures for control room system evaluations were analysed. # e results showed 
that a combination of measures from six categories is necessary to fully access the 
control room system: system performance, task performance, teamwork, use of 
resources, user experience, and identi" cation of design discrepancies. In addition, 
the resilience engineering perspective should be considered in control room system 
evaluations in order to assess the ability to handle unanticipated events.
Requirements on evaluation methods were investigated through analysis of 
characteristics of early product development phases. # e result was that system 
representations in these phases are more conceptual, and that using these 
representations to perform tasks di$ ers in some aspects from use of the " nal system. 
Empirical methods that directly study user interaction with the control room system 
are therefore less suitable for early evaluations. Analytical methods that study use 
indirectly are a better choice. An additional identi" ed requirement is that if methods 
are to be utilised in industry, practitioners must " nd them useful in practice.
To conclude, further work is needed to identify useful analytical evaluation methods 
that can assess measures from the six categories. Suitable methods for early 
assessment of the capacity for resilient behaviour is another topic that needs further 
exploration.
Keywords: Control room, nuclear power, evaluation methods, human factors 
engineering, safe operation, early development, resilience engineering
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11. INTRODUCTION
# is chapter describes the background of the doctoral project, its purpose, aim, 
and research questions. It also details the aim and research questions for the 
present work. # e chapter ends with reading instructions for the licentiate thesis. 
1.1 BACKGROUND
Swedish nuclear power plants were built in a period from the mid-seventies to the 
mid-eighties of the 20th century. Maintenance and modernisation demands have 
led to the initiation of a number of plant development projects. Either directly or 
indirectly, this led to changes in the plants’ control rooms as well. # e modi" cation 
of control rooms creates a need to evaluate whether the changed design continues 
to support safety, productivity and the working environment. # e same applies to 
newly built nuclear power plants too.
Against this background, the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority initiated a study 
(Osvalder and Alm, 2012). # e aim was to study and critically review methods 
and procedures used today to evaluate changes in control rooms and their possible 
impact on safety, productivity and the working environment, and also to discuss 
the need for modi" ed or new methods.
# e study by Osvalder and Alm (2012) showed that Swedish nuclear power plants 
do not have a common view about, or established methods for, how control rooms 
should be evaluated with regard to safety. Other problems noted were the lack of 
baseline measurements, limited use of usability testing, and that methods for risk 
assessment were used in a simpli" ed manner or not at all.
# e report also pointed out that existing risk analysis methods are component-
based and only study the interaction between an operator and single components. 
# e need for a more systemic approach to analysing control rooms was emphasised. 
It was also questioned whether the methods used today are generally adapted to 
the technology found in older control rooms, or if methods are able to analyse 
more modern control room designs as well. Osvalder and Alm (2012) stated that 
practitioners only use a few of the methods available, and that they need methods 
that are 8 exible and simple to use.
CHAPTER  1
2# e report became the foundation for a research project of which this licentiate 
thesis is a part. # e purpose of the project is to improve and further develop 
knowledge of methods for evaluation of modi" ed and newly designed control 
rooms for process control, with a focus on safe operation.
Within the scope of this purpose, the main goals of the research project are to:
1. Provide knowledge, methods and guidelines to support the Swedish Radiation 
Safety Authority in its role as a supervisory and licencing authority.
2. Modify existing and develop new methods, guidelines, and principles.
3. Support and improve national competence in the domain (for example owners, 
consultants and manufacturers) as well as academia.
# e present work concerns the human factors contribution to nuclear safety and 
safe operation. Many de" nitions of the term ‘human factors’ exist, but the de" nition 
utilised in this licentiate thesis is the one from the International Ergonomics 
Association (2016): “the scienti! c discipline concerned with the understanding of 
interactions among humans and other elements of a system, and the profession that 
applies theory, principles, data and methods to design in order to optimize human well-
being and overall system performance”.
In their report, Osvalder and Alm (2012) referred to a report from a workshop 
held by a Nuclear Energy Agency committee regarding modi" cations of nuclear 
power plants (OECD/NEA Committee on Safety of Nuclear Installations, 2005). 
# is report states that human factors e$ orts must start early in the development 
project in order for them to be e$ ective. Introducing them later usually increases 
costs and limits the opportunities for improvements to the system. Human 
factors e$ orts include evaluations, so human factors evaluation methods must 
be suited for use in early stages. In addition to their interview study, Osvalder 
and Alm (2012) reviewed the procedures for human factors work within plant 
modi" cations from all Swedish nuclear power plants. Reading this review, the 
support for and emphasis on human factors veri" cation and validation is evident, 
whereas earlier evaluations are not as clearly stipulated. # is, in addition to the 
author’s own experience of working within the Swedish nuclear power domain, 
points to a need for research into methods for early evaluation.
Evaluation cannot be undertaken without knowing what to evaluate. # e control 
room system’s ability to support safe operation is a phenomenon that must be 
operationalised to make it possible to evaluate. If the control room is to be able 
to conduct safe operation, the road to assessing this goes through identi" yng the 
aspects that contribute to safe operation. 
3Given the above preconditions the following research questions were formulated 
for the research project:
RQ1: Which aspects must be evaluated to assess the control room 
system’s ability to support safe operation of the plant?
RQ2: When evaluating the control room system’s ability to support safe 
operation early in the development process:
a. What characteristics must evaluation methods have?
b. Are there suitable evaluation methods?
c. If there are no suitable methods, how must existing evaluation 
methods be modi" ed in order to be suitable?
1.2 PURPOSE AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
# e purpose of this licentiate thesis was to identify demands on evaluation 
methods for them to be suitable for early assessment of the control room system’s 
ability to support safe operation from a human factors perspective. # e work has 
been focused on the nuclear power domain.
To ful" l this purpose, the present work answers research question 1 and 2a of the 
overall research project, namely:
RQ1: Which aspects must be evaluated to assess the control room 
system’s ability to support safe operation of the plant?
RQ2: When evaluating the control room system’s ability to support 
safe operation early in the development process:
a. What characteristics must evaluation methods have?
1.3 PERSONAL CONTEXT
My educational background is industrial design engineering. Studying engineering 
made problem-solving and the creation of artefacts central to me. # e industrial 
design focus in my education highlighted the need to base this problem-solving 
and creation on a thorough analysis of use and user needs. I have worked as a 
practitioner within the " eld of human factors engineering for ten years, with 
the focus on control room system development. My work was mainly carried 
out within the Swedish nuclear power domain, but it also included work with 
control room systems in other domains, such as train dispatch and combined heat 
and power plants. My practical experience made me aware of the importance 
of methods that are usable in practice. Methods are tools, and like all tools they 
bring value only when they are used. Evaluations are a vital part of development 
work, and integrated systems validations in control room simulators are common 
4practice in the Swedish nuclear power domain. I " nd, however, that the use 
of formative evaluations can be improved further, and that methods for early 
evaluation are needed. Another insight gained during my work-life experience 
was the importance of addressing the control room system. Operator performance 
relies on more than the design of operator interfaces; other parts of the system, 
such as procedures, training, and routines, a$ ect human behaviour as well. # ese 
experiences have to a large degree shaped the scope and focus of this licentiate 
thesis. 
1.4 READING INSTRUCTIONS
# is chapter provides the background, aim, and research questions that form the 
foundation and direction of the work presented in this thesis. In addition, it gives 
a description of the author’s educational and professional background and their 
implications for the present work.
Chapter two presents the research approach and the methodology of the two 
interview studies on which this thesis is based.
# e third chapter explains concepts and terms important for understanding 
the results. To some extent, this applies to chapter four as well, but in addition 
this chapter explores existing evaluation methods and characteristics of early 
evaluation to answer research question 2a. Chapter 5 combines input from the 
interview studies and literature to seek the answer to research question 1.
Chapter 6 discusses the methods, results and implications of the present work. 
Chapter 7 presents the conclusions of this licentiate thesis.
52. RESEARCH APPROACH
# e studied object, the nuclear power plant control room system, is a complex 
socio-technical system. Identi" cation of the aspects that contribute to the control 
room system’s ability to support safe operation (research question 1) solely using 
an empirical approach was possible in theory, but not in practice. In theory 
variables could be changed and the corresponding e$ ect on safe operation could 
be monitored, but the complexity of the system and its environment made this 
approach impossible. # erefore, an empirically based rationalist approach to 
knowledge acquisition was chosen to answer research question 1. Two interview 
studies were performed to utilise the knowledge of professionals within the nuclear 
power domain. # ese provided qualitative empirical data which, combined with 
qualitative data from literature, constituted the base for rationalistic reasoning 
regarding the aspects that contribute to safe operation. # e answer to research 
question 2a (required method characteristics) was explored solely through 
rationalistic reasoning based on qualitative data from literature.
2.1 STUDY I
# e aim of Study I was to identify a foundation for evaluation measures by " nding 
aspects of the control room system that contribute to safe operation from a human 
factors perspective.
# e design of the control room system and the way it is operated will largely a$ ect 
its performance, which makes personnel responsible for design and operation a 
valuable source of information. # us Study I was an interview study to utilise 
the experience of professionals within the Swedish nuclear power domain. # e 
professional roles chosen were those in8 uencing human factors-related aspects 
rather than technical aspects. In total fourteen persons in seven roles were 
interviewed (two representatives of each role). Table 1 shows the characteristics 
of the interviewees.
# e semi-structured interviews took about 1-1.5 hours each and were held at 
the interviewees’ workplace. Documentation was done with audio recordings and 
written notes and the interviews were held by the same interviewer. # e interviews 
were divided into four parts, an introduction, a second section containing broader 
questions, followed by a section with more detailed questions, and a conclusive 
end section. # e third part of the interview used di$ erent angles of the overall 
investigated issue to trigger the interviewees’ thoughts in order to obtain more 
extensive answers. # e contents of the various sections are described in Table 2.
CHAPTER  2
6Table 1: Characteristics of the various groups of interviewees in Study I.
Role Description Background Reactor type 
experience
Reactor operator Responsible for 
operation of safety-
related systems
Operation Half the group 
had experience 
of boiling water 
reactors, the 
other half had 
experience of 
pressurised water 
reactors
Shift supervisor Operatively responsible 
for all work in the control 
room
Operation See above
Instructor Responsible for 
implementing training of 
operators
Operation See above
Human factors 
specialist working 
for the plant owner 
(licensee)
Responsible for human 
factors issues in plant 
modi! cation projects
Behavioural 
science and/or 
engineering
N.a.
Human reliability 
analysis specialists
Performing human 
reliability analyses as 
part of the probabilistic 
safety analyses
Behavioural 
science and/or 
engineering
N.a.
Human factors 
specialist, Swedish 
Radiation Safety 
Authority
Responsible for 
reviewing the ful! lment 
of safety requirements
Behavioural 
science and/or 
engineering
N.a.
Inspector, Swedish 
Radiation Safety 
Authority
Responsible for 
reviewing the ful! lment 
of safety requirements
Operation Boiling water 
reactors, one 
also had limited 
experience of 
pressurised water 
reactors
7Table 2: Contents of the various sections of the interviews in Study I.
Introduction
• Explaining the purpose of the study
• Explaining to the interviewees that their view of what contributes to safe  
operation was sought, not ‘the right answer’
• Explaining that the interviewees should not only consider the physical control 
room design when answering the questions, but also include items such as 
procedures and personnel 
• Questions regarding the interviewees’ role, the duration of their experience in 
that role, and their previous experiences regarding employment and education
Broader questions
• The interviewees’ view of the meaning of the term ‘safe operation’ and the 
de! nition of the term for the study in question
• What contributes to safe operation
• What contributes most to safe operation
• What in the control room system needs to be evaluated to assess if it supports 
safe operation
• To interviewees with an operational background: recollection of a real-life or 
simulator-set event with negative/potentially negative consequences, and 
aspects that saved the situation or mitigated the e" ects
Detailed questions
• What must be possible to perform in the control room system. The approach 
used: look at the human-machine system from a task point of view, consider the 
control room system as a performer of tasks (something the system does).
• What sub-functions must exist in the control room system. The approach used: 
look at the system from a functional point of view, consider the control room 
system as a compilation of abilities (something the system has the capacity to 
do).
• What parts the control room system should consist of. The approach used: look 
at the system from a structural point of view, consider the control room system 
as a collection of physical or social parts that realise the system.
• What characteristics the control room system should have. The approach used: 
discuss the control room system in terms of characteristics of the physical or 
social parts; the necessary properties of the structural elements.
Conclusion
• Summary of the interviewee’s answers (to give an opportunity to correct 
misunderstandings)
• What contributes most and least to safe operation, since the interview might 
have led the interviewee to think more speci! cally about this issue.
8# e qualitative material from the interviews was analysed using thematic 
analysis, a primarily descriptive approach to de" ning broad categories (themes) 
that describes signi" cant features of data (Howitt, 2013). # e thematic analysis 
procedure consists of six steps: data familiarisation, initial coding generation, 
search for themes based on initial coding, review of the themes, theme de" nition 
and labelling, and report writing. Going through these steps should be an iterative 
process and not a linear one (Howitt, 2013).
# e interview data was transcribed (in full). Initial codes were generated by 
marking statements regarding aspects of the control room system that contribute 
to safe operation and summarising their content into one or a few words. # e 
initial codes were searched for patterns that indicated themes and sub-themes. 
# e angles utilised in the third part of the interview were used to structure the 
initial coding, but were modi" ed to better " t the data.
# e empirical data from Study I was used in an additional analysis to explore 
how aspects of the nuclear power plant control room system can be connected 
to the four basic abilities of resilient performance (respond, monitor, anticipate, 
and learn; these are further described in section 3.1). # e result of this analysis 
is presented in Paper III. # e perspective used in Study I – what contributes to 
safe operation, not what threatens it – is in line with the focus of investigating 
not only the things that go wrong, but also the things that go right argued in 
resilience engineering (Hollnagel, 2013). # us the interview data from Study 
I was deemed relevant for this second analysis. Statements concerning aspects 
deemed to a$ ect any of the four cornerstones of resilience were marked. Each of 
the four groups of statements was then reviewed again and the themes presented 
in Paper I (described in section 5.3) were used to connect concrete aspects of 
the control room system design to the four basic resilient abilities. # e four basic 
resilient abilities are functions, and these are in turn made possible by underlying 
sub-functions. # e focus of Paper III was the design of the control room system, 
so tasks were expressed as the functions requiring the performance of these tasks, 
and the structural elements and their associated characteristics needed to perform 
these tasks. Situations, as they were de" ned in Paper I, concern the system’s 
resilient behaviour as a whole, and were not connected to speci" c cornerstones.
# e results of Study I are presented in sections 5.3 and 5.5.
92.2 STUDY II
One path towards increasing the control room system’s ability to support safe 
operation is to identify usability problems in the control room system design so 
they can be recti" ed. # e availability of new technologies brings changes in nuclear 
power control room system design, which may a$ ect the usability problems that 
occur. # e evaluation methods used will determine the type of measures that 
can be implemented, meaning that " nding di$ erent types of usability problems 
will require the use of di$ erent evaluation methods. It is therefore interesting to 
investigate the types of usability problems found in present and future nuclear 
power control room systems to be able to identify suitable measures and methods.
# e aim of Study II was to suggest requirements that the human factors evaluation 
methods must ful" l to be useful. # e requirements were to be based on possible 
usability problems that required attention in the design of future Swedish nuclear 
power control room systems.
Design trends in future Swedish nuclear power control room systems were 
investigated through six semi-structured phone interviews with seven professionals 
(one of the interviews was a group interview with two persons). # e interviewees 
were in a position of responsibility for human factors issues in the control rooms 
of their respective production units. # ey therefore had knowledge of forthcoming 
control room alterations, as well as insights regarding the development of their 
units’ control rooms in the more distant future. # e interviews covered all ten 
reactors in Sweden. # e interviews were all conducted by the same person and 
took about one hour each. # e interviews were documented in handwritten notes.
# e questions concerned the control room system changes planned for each 
unit, the reasons for making the changes, when the changes were planned to be 
implemented as well as what changes the interviewee believed would be made in 
the more distant future (i.e. changes the interviewee viewed as probable but not 
yet decided by the plant owners). 
In addition to investigating modi" cations in today’s nuclear power plants, Study 
II sought information on control room systems in new plant designs. For this 
reason an additional interview was conducted. # is interview was held with a 
person who had knowledge about the control room designs for two generation 
III+ reactors. Current reactors in Sweden today are generation II, and the term 
generation III+ is used to denote a category of more modern reactors. Generation 
III+ reactors are the most modern reactors being built today. # e control rooms 
of the new generation III+ reactor types are in theory standardised, but may 
be changed according to the requirements and needs of the customer in each 
individual implementation. Only the standardised design of the control rooms 
was investigated in Study II. # is interview took about two hours and was carried 
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out face to face by the same person who undertook the other six interviews. # e 
interviewee was asked to describe forthcoming design trends in the control rooms 
of two speci" c generation III+ reactor types. # is interview was also documented 
in handwritten notes.
# e identi" ed control room system design trends were analysed in terms of 
usability problems that could potentially arise. # e resulting usability problems 
are not to be regarded as a comprehensive list of usability problems that may occur 
in future control rooms, but they do indicate requirements concerning human 
factors methods for evaluating safe operation in control room systems. 
# e results of Study II are presented in section 5.4.
11
3. NUCLEAR POWER PLANT CONTROL 
ROOM SYSTEMS
# is chapter describes the application area of this licentiate thesis, nuclear power 
plant control room systems. Safety and safe operation are two central concepts, as 
is the activity of control room system modernisations.
3.1 SAFETY-I AND SAFETY-II
A traditional de" nition of safety is that it is freedom from unacceptable risk. 
A consequence of this view is that the focus is on what goes wrong, and the 
road to safety goes through looking for failures, trying to " nd their causes, and 
trying to eliminate causes and/or improving barriers (Hollnagel, 2013). However, 
socio-technical systems such as nuclear power plants are complex because the 
interactions between elements of the system are complex. Complex interactions 
bring about unfamiliar or unexpected sequences of events, sequences that are either 
not visible or not immediately comprehensible (Perrow, 1999). Trying to remove 
the possibility for all of these unexpected and unwanted outcomes in complex 
systems is extremely di=  cult (or even impossible). A complementary view of 
safety addresses this problem by de" ning safety as the ability to succeed under 
varying conditions, so that the number of intended and acceptable outcomes is as 
high as possible (Hollnagel, 2013). # e traditional view of safety has been dubbed 
Safety-I and the complementary Safety-II. # e intrinsic ability of a system to 
adjust its functioning prior to, during, or following changes and disturbances, 
so that the system can sustain required operations under both expected and 
unexpected conditions, is called resilience (Hollnagel, 2011b). # is de" nition 
emphases that a system should not only strive to avoid failures, but to adapt its 
functioning to handle all conditions. Resilience engineering is the " eld that has 
developed theories, methods, and tools to deliberately manage this adaptive ability 
of organisations in order to make them function e$ ectively and safely (Nemeth 
and Herrera, 2015). Resilience engineering argues that the focus should be on 
increasing the number of things that go right, which as a natural consequence will 
decrease the number of things that go wrong.
3.2 SAFE OPERATION IN NUCLEAR POWER
Nuclear safety is de" ned by the International Atomic Energy Agency as “" e 
achievement of proper operating conditions, prevention of accidents or mitigation of 
accident consequences, resulting in protection of workers, the public and the environment 
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from undue radiation hazards” (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2007). A 
presentation of underlying objectives and principles of nuclear safety is given 
by the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (1999). # e framework 
provided there contains three overriding safety objectives, six fundamental safety 
principles, and nine technical principles, which provide a general framework for 
a number of speci" c safety principles (Figure 1). # e latter are grouped mainly 
after the main stage in a nuclear power plant’s lifetime where they are applicable. 
# e " rst overriding safety objective is a general nuclear safety objective: “To protect 
individuals, society and the environment by establishing and maintaining in nuclear 
power plants an e# ective defence against radiological hazard” (International Nuclear 
Safety Advisory Group, 1999, p.8). # e other two overriding safety objectives are 
overlapping objectives regarding radiation protection and technical safety (such as 
pointing to the use of reliable components). Together, the three objectives ensure 
completeness.
# e concept of defence in depth is a fundamental principle in nuclear safety. 
International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (1999) describes the concept 
as implementing several levels of protection, including successive barriers 
preventing the release of radioactive materials to the environment, to compensate 
for potential human and mechanical failures. # is includes all safety activities, 
whether organisational, behavioural or equipment related. # ere are " ve levels of 
defence in depth, and they range from preventing abnormal operation and failures 
to mitigating radiological consequences of signi" cant releases of radioactive 
materials. # e strategy is to " rst prevent accidents and if this fails, limit the 
potential consequences of accidents and prevent them from evolving into more 
serious conditions.
Because of the potentially harmful consequences nuclear power plants are 
regulated at the governmental level to protect people and the environment from 
the undesirable e$ ects of radiation. Human factors is stated as a general technical 
principle in the framework by the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group 
(1999). # is principle proclaims that the possibility of human error should be 
handled by facilitating correct decisions by operators and inhibiting incorrect ones, 
as well as by providing means for detecting and correcting or compensating for 
errors. In Swedish nuclear power plants human factors issues are regulated by the 
Swedish Radiation Safety Authority. Chapter 3 section 3 of the regulatory code 
SSMFS 2008:1 stipulate that “the design shall be adapted to the personnel ’s ability 
to, in a safe manner, monitor and manage the facility and the abnormal operation and 
accident conditions which can occur”. More detailed regulations for control room 
design and emergency control posts are given in another regulatory code, SSMFS 
2008:17.
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Nuclear power plants must not only be safe, they must be safe while producing 
electricity. In the long run safety and production are prerequisites for each other. 
Combining the demand to produce electricity with the demand to uphold nuclear 
safety concludes that a nuclear power plant must produce electricity without 
exposing workers, the public or the environment to radiation hazards. # is is a 
de" nition of the term safe operation from a Safety-I perspective. A de" nition of 
safe operation from a Safety-II perspective would be that the nuclear power plant 
must produce electricity and operate the process within permitted operational 
limits during all conditions. In Sweden, clearly de" ned operational limits and 
conditions are stipulated by the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority in chapter 
5 section 1 of the regulatory code SSMFS 2008:1. # ese should, together with 
procedures, provide personnel with the guidance they need to be able to conduct 
operations in accordance with what the plant is designed to handle, as stated in 
the plant’s safety analysis report.
3.3 THE CONTROL ROOM SYSTEM
A control room is a functional entity responsible for the operational control 
of something, for example a nuclear power plant or train dispatch. # e control 
room, including its associated physical structure, is where the operators carry out 
centralised control, monitoring and administrative responsibilities (International 
Standard Organisation, 2000). 
# e nuclear power plant control room is a place where human operators exercise 
control over a process. Tschirner (2015) propose four prerequisites that must be 
ful" lled for a human operator to achieve e=  cient control over a process. First, the 
operator needs a clear goal, such as a state to reach or a condition within which 
a system must be maintained. Second, the operator needs a model of the process, 
the system, and the environment to be able to assess the current state of the 
system and predict future ones. # ird, the operator must be able to observe the 
current state of the system, environment, and process. Fourth, the operator must 
be able to control the process.
# e nuclear power plant operators’ work in normal operation is typically calm 
and can be carried out according to prede" ned routines. Routines typically exist 
for undesired events as well, but situations where the operator has to handle an 
unfamiliar situation without the support of routines will also occur.
A nuclear power plant control room is operated by a team of operators, who 
work in shifts to allow continuous operation. Responsibilities are divided among 
the operators, creating di$ erent roles. In Swedish nuclear power plants these are 
typically shift supervisor, reactor operator, turbine operator, and " eld operators. 
An assistant reactor operator or an electrical operator is also included in the shift 
team, depending on the reactor type.
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# e physical structure of the nuclear power plant control room includes operator 
interfaces, which can be screen-based or analogue. # e operator interfaces may 
be installed so they can be operated while sitting or standing, and viewed from 
nearby or from further away. In addition to the equipment needed to control the 
plant directly, more indirectly contributing parts such as a meeting area and o=  ce 
for the shift supervisor are often included in the control room as well.
Procedures are often used to guide operations in the control room, especially 
within the nuclear power domain. Traditionally they are presented on paper, but in 
recent years computer-based procedures have been developed as well. Procedures 
play a very important part in the operation of nuclear power plants and, as stated 
in chapter 5 section 1 of SSMFS 2008:1, are required by the Swedish regulator to 
provide personnel with the guidance they need.
In this licentiate thesis, the focus will be on the control room system, a socio-
technical system including humans, technology, and organisational elements. # is 
focus was chosen to emphasise that the operator interfaces and other parts of the 
physical structure are not enough to achieve proper control. Other components 
such as the operators’ competence, procedures, roles in the shift team, and work 
routines are also vital for the function of the control room system. In the present 
work, a control room system is de" ned as a socio-technical system consisting of 
humans, technology, and organisational elements that exercise centralised control 
and monitoring over a process, as well as administrative responsibilities.
3.4 CONTROL ROOM SYSTEM MODERNISATION
A control room system rarely stays unchanged from its initial construction to 
its " nal decommissioning. Control room system modernisations can be initiated 
for many reasons, and examples for nuclear power can be found in a report 
from a Nuclear Energy Agency committee (OECD/NEA Committee on 
Safety of Nuclear Installations, 2005). Reasons stated in the report include, but 
are not restricted to, recti" cation of plant de" ciencies, improvements in plant 
performance, adaptation to new regulatory requirements, and the utilisation of 
new technologies. Depending on the reason for change and the budget available, 
control room system modernisations can di$ er considerably in scope. # ey may 
range from the changing of a set point or the substitution of a component to a 
total upgrade of the entire control room system (OECD/NEA Committee on 
Safety of Nuclear Installations, 2005).
If the operation controlled by the control room system is safety-critical, changes 
to the control room system will have potential safety consequences, due to the 
control room system’s operational signi" cance (Norros and Nuutinen, 2005). For 
nuclear power, this view is shared in the report by the OECD/NEA Committee on 
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Safety of Nuclear Installations (2005), where it is emphasised that modi" cations 
have the potential to introduce challenges to safety if they are not carried out with 
the necessary caution and prudence.
# e Swedish Radiation Safety Authority’s regulatory code SSMFS 2008:1 
chapter 3 section 3 stipulates that the design of the nuclear power plant must “be 
adapted to the personnel ’s ability to, in a safe manner, monitor and manage the facility 
and the abnormal operation and accident conditions which can occur”. # e general 
advice in the regulatory code SSMFS 2008:17 section 18 suggests that examples 
of methodology for the evaluation of control room modi" cations are to be found 
in documentation from the United Stated Nuclear Regulatory Commission (U.S. 
NRC), NUREG-0711. # is document provides sta$  at the U.S. NRC with a 
review methodology that addresses the scope of a human factors engineering review 
of plant modi" cations or newly built plants (United States Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, 2012). In Sweden, and in other countries, NUREG-7011 is used as 
guidance for deciding which human factors activities should be included in plant 
development projects, and how these should be performed.
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4. DEVELOPMENT AND EVALUATION OF 
CONTROL ROOM SYSTEMS
# is chapter describes the process for development of control room systems and 
the role evaluation plays in this process. It also presents an overview of evaluation 
measures and methods, as well as what is required of methods for evaluation in 
the early phases of the development process. 
4.1 THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
Man-made things do not appear out of nowhere, and organisations designing 
and developing things normally follow some sort of process to do so. Ulrich and 
Eppinger (2003, p. 14) use the term ‘product development process’, which they 
describe as “the sequence of steps or activities which an enterprise employs to conceive, 
design, and commercialize a product”. Other bene" ts of using a well-de" ned 
development process stated by Ulrich and Eppinger (2003) are that it supports 
quality assurance, coordination, planning, management, and improvement.
# ere are numerous suggestions for how development processes are and should 
be structured. # ey di$ er, among other things, in how much of the product 
life cycle they cover and what is included in each phase. Some end after the 
design is " nished and others include production. One common theme however, 
is the gradual increase in detailing of the solution. A phase establishing a more 
overall design solution normally precedes a phase where a more detailed design 
is developed.
# e planning and design process suggested by Pahl and Beitz (1996) includes 
four phases. # e " rst phase, planning and clarifying the task, has the purpose 
of collecting information about the requirements that have to be ful" lled by 
the product, as well as existing constraints. # e second, the conceptual design 
phase, determines the principal solution, and is followed by the embodiment 
design phase where the construction structure (overall layout) is determined. # e 
arrangements, forms, dimensions, and surface properties of all individual parts are 
then decided on in the detail design phase.
# e beginning of a process suggested by Ulrich and Eppinger (2003) is similar to 
the process proposed by Pahl and Beitz (1996), up to and including detail design, 
but it also includes the testing and re" nement phases, and production ramp-up at 
the end. Testing and re" nement are where preproduction versions of the product 
CHAPTER  4
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are constructed and evaluated to " nalise the design. # e purpose of production 
ramp-up is to train the work force and to work out remaining problems in the 
production process.
A plant, such as a nuclear power plant, is normally not viewed as a product. # at does 
not mean that developing and modifying them does not need a structured process. 
# e OECD/NEA Committee on Safety of Nuclear Installations (2005) stated in 
a report that a systematic approach to plant modi" cations is necessary to reduce 
the risk posed by modi" cations. # ey suggest that an established and documented 
modi" cation process ensures consistency, repeatability, and traceability. Hale et al. 
(2007), in a special issue of Safety Science on safety in design, summarise six main 
phases in typical design processes for complex technical systems involving major 
accident hazards: business development; feasibility study; conceptual design; basic 
design; detailed design; and fabrication, installation, commissioning and start-up. 
# e main di$ erence between this process and the ones proposed by Pahl and 
Beitz (1996) and Ulrich and Eppinger (2003) is the " nal phase. # is is a natural 
consequence of the fact that many complex technical systems, such as process 
plants or o$ shore platforms, are uniquely built and installed, not mass-produced. 
# e three processes described above are summarised in Table 3.
Table 3: Overall correspondence between phases in di" erent development processes.
Another issue di$ erentiating the development process of complex technical 
systems from that of other products is the development of procedures and training. 
# e operation of complex technical systems is often very dependent on both 
procedures and training of personnel. While not unimportant for other products, 
training and procedures are seldom a requirement for use. # e same is true for 
training, and if it is a requirement for use it is often not the responsibility of the 
company developing the product. # is emphasis on procedures and training for 
complex technical systems is evident in the process indicated by NUREG-0711, 
Pahl and Beitz 
(1996)
Ulrich and Eppinger 
(2003)
Hale et al. 
(2007)
Planning and clarifying 
the task
Planning Business development
Feasibility study
Conceptual design Conceptual design Conceptual design
Embodiment design System-level-design Basic design
Detail design Detail design Detailed design
Testing and re! nement
Production ramp-up
Fabrication
Installation
Start-up
Commissioning
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the nuclear power review methodology guide presented in section 3.4 (United 
States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2012). In this document, procedure 
development and training programme development are equal parts of the design 
phase together with human-system interface design.
# e previously mentioned report by the OECD/NEA Committee on Safety 
of Nuclear Installations (2005) stated that there is a need for guidelines and 
tools to support the modi" cation process in incorporating human factors 
assessments, among other areas. # ere are several standards proposing processes 
or ways for how human factors aspects are to be included in design, such as 
“ISO 6385:2004 Ergonomic principles in the design of work systems” (International 
Standard Organisation, 2004) and “ISO 11064-1:2000 Ergonomic design of control 
centres – Part 1: Principles for the design of control centres” (International Standard 
Organisation, 2000).
ISO 6385:2004 advocates the iteration of certain activities in various phases of 
the design process: analysis, synthesis, simulation and evaluation. # e phases 
suggested are: formulation of goals (requirements analysis); analysis and allocation 
of functions; design concept; detailed design; realisation, implementation and 
validation; evaluation. ISO 11064-1:2000, which speci" cally concerns ergonomic 
design of control centres, also emphasises the iterative nature of the process. 
# is standard presents a framework for an ergonomic design process consisting 
of the following phases: clari" cation; analysis and de" nition; conceptual design; 
detailed design; and operational feedback. # e processes are largely similar, the 
major di$ erence being the inclusion of realisation and implementation in the ISO 
6385:2004 process that has no correspondence in the ISO 11064-1:2000 process. 
Realisation includes the building, production or purchase of the work system and 
its installation in the place of operation. Realisation should also include " ne-
tuning of the system in accordance with local context. Implementation includes 
introducing the work system to all people concerned with it, for instance through 
information and training (International Standard Organisation, 2004). It should 
be noted, however, that the development of training regimes and the like is included 
in detail design in the ISO 11064-1:2000 process. # e overall correspondence 
between phases in ISO 6385:2004 and ISO 11064-1:2000 is shown in Table 4.
One di$ erence in these processes in Table 4 when compared to the ones summarised 
in Table 3 is the emphasis on acquiring operational feedback after the design 
has been in operation for some time. # e purpose is to continuously check on 
the validity of the design of the control centre during its lifespan (International 
Standard Organisation, 2000).
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4.2 EVALUATION IN THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
A speci" c issue raised at the workshop that formed the foundation for the 
aforementioned OECD/NEA report was that the process for modi" cation of 
nuclear power plats should include actions to verify the ful" lment of requirements 
and validate the appropriateness of the modi" cation (OECD/NEA Committee 
on Safety of Nuclear Installations, 2005). # e same issue, but regarding safety in 
complex technical systems involving major accident hazards, was raised by Hale 
et al. (2007), who noted that one similarity between development processes was 
iterative safety checks in conjunction with decisions to move on to the next design 
phase, to ensure the focus on safety issues as the design develops. 
Ullman (1997) describes design as the successive development and application of 
constraints to reduce the number of potential solutions to a problem, until only 
one unique product remains. # e majority of constraints follow as a consequence 
of design decisions, and sometimes as a consequence of the absence of decisions. 
Choosing one alternative solution over others means adding constraints that 
make the rejected solutions unsuitable. Comparing the contraints to alternative 
soloutions is called evaluation, and the best alternative can be chosen based on 
the result of the evaluation. # is view is in line with the dictionary de" nition of 
the word evaluation, “the making of a judgment about the amount, number, or value 
of something” (Oxford Dictionaries, 2015a).
Evaluations in the development process can be categorised in several ways, one 
way being the purpose for which the evaluation takes place. Evaluations can 
be divided into formative and summative, where the former has the purpose of 
improving the object that is being evaluated and the latter is meant to provide 
a concluding quality assessment. Due to this di$ erence in purpose formative 
evaluations are usually performed during the development process and summative 
on the " nished design (Noyes, 2004).
ISO 6385:2004 
Ergonomic principles in the 
design of work systems
ISO 11064-1:2000 
Ergonomic design of control centres – Part 1: 
Principles for the design of control centres
Formulation of goals 
(requirements analysis)
Clari! cation
Analysis and allocation of 
functions
Analysis and de! nition
Design concept Conceptual design
Detailed design Detailed design [validation included here]
Realisation, implementation 
and validation
[no correspondence to realisation and 
implementation]
Evaluation Operational feedback
Table 4: Overall correspondence between phases in ISO 6385:2004 and ISO 11064-1:2000.
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A di$ erent categorisation of evaluations can be made between veri" cation and 
validation. An ergonomics standard for the ergonomic design of control centres 
(International Standard Organisation, 2006, p. 1) de" nes the evaluation process 
as the “combined e# ort of all veri! cation and validation (V&V) activities in a 
project using selected methods and the recording of the results” – hence using the word 
‘evaluation’ as an overall concept containing the more speci" c activities veri" cation 
and validation. # e same standard de" nes veri" cation as “con! rmation, through 
the provision of objective evidence, that speci! ed requirements have been ful! lled” 
(International Standard Organisation, 2006, p. 2) and validation as “con! rmation, 
through the provision of objective evidence, that the requirements for a speci! c intended 
use or application have been ful! lled” (ibid). Engel (2010, p. 19), having studied 
de" nitions of veri" cation and validation from multiple sources, adopted the 
de" nitions that veri" cation is “the process of evaluating a system to determine whether 
the products of a given lifecycle phase satisfy the conditions imposed at the start of that 
phase” and that validation is “the process of evaluating a system to determine whether it 
satis! es the stakeholders of that system” (ibid). Veri" cation, in both these de" nitions, 
has the purpose of assessing the ful" lment of requirements (or di$ erently put, 
satisfaction of conditions). # e de" nitions of the term ‘validation’ are less similar, 
but both embrace a more holistic assessment than the one done in veri" cation 
concerning the satisfaction of requirements of use or stakeholders.
4.3 HUMAN FACTORS EVALUATION MEASURES AND METHODS
Meister (2001) de" nes measurement as the analytic phase that determines the 
questions to be asked and how measurement will provide the answers sought, 
as well as the following collection of data and a concluding analysis phase that 
examines what the measurement means. A similar description can be provided of 
the process of evaluation:
1. Determine the evaluation measures. What is the purpose of the evaluation 
and of the system, and how can this be operationalised?
2. Determine acceptance criteria. At what level is the measure regarded as good 
enough?
3. Collection of data. Determining the value of evaluation measures for the 
object to be evaluated.
4. Comparison of the collected data with acceptance criteria, making a judgement.
# e issue of determining acceptance criteria is emphasised by the Institute 
of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (1999). # eir guide for evaluation 
of human-system performance in nuclear power generating stations states 
that the interpretation of results in an evaluation requires the speci" cation of 
criteria for judging the acceptability of the human-system performance. # e 
guide di$ erentiates between informal criteria, “evaluator’s opinion regarding the 
acceptability of the performance”, and formal criteria, such as “operator diagnosis 
within a speci! c time limit” (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 
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1999, p. 3). Acceptance criteria can be determined in several ways. For example, 
the human factors engineering programme review model NUREG-0711 of the 
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (2012) describes four di$ erent 
bases for this:
• Requirement: Quanti" ed performance requirements for the performance of 
systems, subsystems, and personnel are de" ned through engineering analyses.
• Benchmark: A benchmark system, a current system deemed to be acceptable, 
is used to de" ne acceptance criteria. # is can be done by evaluating the same 
system before and after change.
• Norm: Instead of a single benchmark system many predecessor systems can be 
used to create a norm against which the system under evaluation is compared.
• Expert Judgment: Subject-matter experts establish the acceptance criteria.
One tool in performing evaluations is that of evaluation methods. # e dictionary 
de" nition of a method is “a particular procedure for accomplishing or approaching 
something, especially a systematic or established one” (Oxford Dictionaries, 2015b), 
hence an evaluation method is a systematic procedure for making a judgement 
about something.
Numerous human factors evaluation methods exist, and in this licentiate thesis they 
are categorised by what they measure and how that measurement is performed. 
Categorisation according to evaluation measures is inspired by compilations and 
reviews of human factors evaluation methods (Stanton et al., 2005, International 
Standard Organisation, 2006, Le Blanc et al., 2010, Savioja et al., 2014). In the 
present work, evaluation measures are divided into the following categories:
• System performance. Measures the performance of the whole system together. 
In the case of control room systems, this could be measuring crucial plant 
parameters such as tank levels and temperatures.
• Task performance. Measures the performance of tasks, such as the number and 
nature of errors, or time.
• Teamwork. Measures meant to assess the quality of team-based activity.
• Use of resources. Measures meant to assess di$ erent aspects of the operators’ 
use of their mental and physical resources, such as situation awareness, mental 
workload, and physical load.
• User experience. Measures assessing the feelings and emotions of the operators. 
# e de" nition of user experience measures utilised here is the one by Savioja 
et al. (2014, p. 429): measures that indicate “the users’ subjective feeling of the 
appropriateness of the proposed tool for the activity”.
• Identi! cation of design discrepancies. # e appropriateness of the system is 
evaluated by assessing its compliance with an ideal. # is can be done explicitly 
by comparing the design of the system with guidelines, or implicitly by allowing 
experts assess the system’s quality.
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Advantages and disadvantages can be identi" ed for each of the categories described 
above. Measures of system and task performance have the advantage of being 
closely connected to the system goal, but have the disadvantage that the evaluation 
result provides little guidance on how the identi" ed issues should be addressed. In 
other words, these measures point out the problem, but tell us little about what we 
should do about it. In contrast, the identi" cation of design discrepancies displays 
in much greater detail how issues should be remedied. Accurately measuring task 
performance requires a de" nition of what constitutes a deviation from the correct 
execution of tasks. Measures such as errors and time are situation- and system-
dependent, and must be judged as such (Le Blanc et al., 2010).
Teamwork, use of resources, user experience, and identi" cation of design 
discrepancies all have the ability to identify problem areas that may not show 
directly in system or task performance during an evaluation. # eir advantage is 
that they can identify issues that may lead to insu=  cient performance in a slightly 
di$ erent context than the exact one tested (for instance with more inexperienced 
operators or another combination of events). # e use of these measures is 
motivated by the assumption that a control room evaluation cannot, for practical 
reasons, recreate every possible situation that might occur in the control room 
system’s lifetime.
# e other categorisation of human factors evaluation methods in this licentiate 
thesis is by the nature of the studies in which the measures are taken (how 
measurement is done): empirical and analytical (Osvalder et al., 2009). Empirical 
studies are direct studies of use where users carry out tasks using actual (or mock-
ups of ) systems. Analytical studies more indirectly study use by letting di$ erent 
subject-matter experts investigate the system analytically without any actual use 
taking place. # ese categories are not discrete, but rather more of a spectrum. 
For example, a talk-through with an operator using a very early prototype would 
be closer to the analytical side of the spectrum since the interaction with the 
prototype may be very di$ erent from how interaction would be with the " nished 
system.
# e two categories described above, what and how measures are taken, can be 
combined to create 12 groups of evaluation methods. Finding actual evaluation 
methods suitable for early evaluation of control room systems does not lie within 
the scope of this licentiate thesis. However, examples of methods were needed 
to better describe the groups of evaluation methods. An initial review of existing 
methods was undertaken and the result can be seen in Table 5. # is review was not 
able to distinguish examples for all groups. A more thorough review of existing 
methods will be performed as part of the future work within this doctoral project.
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Reliability and validity are two concepts important in the use of methods. In a 
research tradition concerned with quantitative data there is a general agreement 
on the de" nition of these concepts. High reliability within this tradition is when 
repeated measurements of the same object deliver the same result. Validity 
indicates how well what is meant to be measured actually is measured (Svensson 
and Starrin, 1996). Within the research tradition concerned with qualitative data, 
however, these concepts are handled somewhat di$ erently. Reliability in this 
tradition must be viewed in its context. For example, one cannot simply compare 
two answers from di$ erent interviews and consider the question reliable if the 
answers are alike. Reliability cannot be judged without also judging the validity 
of the question in the context in which it was asked. Identical questions in two 
di$ erent interviews can be considered reliable even if the answers di$ er (Svensson 
and Starrin, 1996). # e de" nition of the concept of validity within the qualitative 
research tradition can be divided into two overall views. One considers the 
concept usable for studies with qualitative data, the other considers terms such as 
authenticity or trustworthiness to be more relevant. However, their approach for 
testing validity is often similar, namely that validity should be judged in relation to 
context and the persons involved (Svensson and Starrin, 1996). Hammersley and 
Atkinson (1983), referenced in Svensson and Starrin (1996), claim that a method 
in itself is neither valid nor invalid. Validity is not a characteristic inherent in a 
speci" c method, but belongs to the data, presentation, and conclusions that have 
been reached by using the method in a speci" c context for a speci" c purpose.
4.4 EVALUATION METHODS IN EARLY STAGES OF THE DEVELOPMENT 
PROCESS
In a special issue of Safety Science on safety in design Hale et al. (2007) point 
out that safety imposes additional requirements on the design and design process 
and may add to costs, decreasing pro" t margins and market share. To address 
these challenges, Hale et al. (2007) state that safety implications have to be taken 
into account early on, otherwise it may be necessary to implement expensive and 
less user-friendly safety add-ons later on. Papin (2002) advocates the same for 
nuclear power plants, stating that most of the situations seriously challenging the 
operators’ performance have their origin in design decisions taken early in the 
development process. For nuclear power plants, these design de" ciencies concern 
reactor system design rather than operator interface design (ibid).
Savioja (2014) stresses the importance of performing evaluations early in the design 
process. Boring (2014) does the same, stating that the feedback that evaluation 
early in the design process can provide will help ensure that errors in human-
system integration are eliminated rather than incorporated into nuclear power 
plant control room system design. Boring (2014) concludes that there is a need 
to perform evaluations earlier in the design cycle. As described in section 3.4, the 
review guide NUREG-0711 (United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
26
2012) is widely used to guide control room system modernisations within the 
nuclear power domain. It states that a structured methodology, including tests 
and evaluations during the design phase, should be used to guide design work. 
However, as Boring (2014) points out, it lacks explicit guidance for human-system 
interaction evaluations during the design phase.
Earlier evaluation seems to be desirable, but what does this imply? As was 
described in section 4.1, the development process is often divided into phases with 
a gradually increasing level of detail in the developed system. In the development 
process described by Pahl and Beitz (1996) that was described in section 4.1, the 
level of detail in the design is divided into the following main stages:
• Detailed product proposal (phase Planning and clarifying the task): a clari" cation 
of the task that includes information about the requirements that have to be 
ful" lled by the product, as well as the existing constraints and their importance.
• Conceptual design: a speci" cation of principle that establishes function 
structures and working principles.
• Embodiment design: a speci" cation of overall layout design (general arrangement 
and spatial compatibility), preliminary form designs (component shapes and 
materials) and production processes.
• Detail design: a speci" cation of arrangements, forms, dimensions, and surface 
properties of all individual parts.
Hollnagel (1985) classi" ed evaluation methods in a way that connects to the 
di$ erent levels of detail in the design speci" ed by Pahl and Beitz (1996). # e 
classi" cation is done according to how the system being evaluated is represented 
in the evaluation. Four types of system representation are speci" ed:
• Conceptual, where the system is not represented physically but by a description 
of its functional characteristics.
• Static simulation, where the system is represented by samples taken from 
preliminary performance recordings, for example a series of frozen frames 
focused on how information is presented to the operator.
• Dynamic simulation, where the entire process is simulated and the operators 
react to the simulated process.
• " e real system, the design implemented in its intended context.
Comparing them suggests that conceptual system representations would be 
available when the design is in the conceptual design stage, and possibly also 
in the detailed product proposal phase. Static simulation system representations 
could be created when the design is in the embodiment design and detail design 
phase. Dynamic simulations could be done when the design is in the detailed 
design phase.
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# e use of system representations available in the detailed design phase will in 
some aspects di$ er from the use of system representations available earlier in 
the development process. One example of such aspects is the time to complete 
tasks, the time it takes to perform a task using a paper mock-up is not necessarily 
representative of the time it takes with the " nal product. A method designed 
to assess aspects of actual use might therefore not be suitable when system 
representations are more conceptual. # us analytical methods that utilise indirect 
studies of use would be more suitable for earlier evaluations.
28
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5. EVALUATION MEASURES FOR NUCLEAR 
POWER PLANT CONTROL ROOM SYSTEMS
# e " rst step in the evaluation process is to determine the evaluation measures. 
With regard to control room systems, if the purpose of the evaluation is to assess 
the control room system’s ability to support safe operation – how can this be 
measured? # is chapter will explore which of the categories of evaluation measures 
presented in section 4.3 are relevant for control room systems.
5.1 MEASURES IN EMPIRICAL CONTROL ROOM SYSTEM EVALUATIONS
Evaluations to assess the suitability of nuclear power plant control room systems 
are nothing new, since after being built they must be maintained as well as modi" ed 
and modernised. # is section reviews performed and planned nuclear power plant 
control room system evaluations presented in academic literature. Since the focus 
of this licentiate thesis is evaluation of the control room system as a whole studies 
evaluating only smaller parts of the control room are not included in this review. 
# e purpose is to gain an overview of the measures used to evaluate control room 
systems and to compare these to the categories presented in section 4.3.
In her doctoral thesis, Savioja (2014) undertook a literature review of empirical 
studies of control rooms in the nuclear power domain. 22 empirical studies were 
reviewed, and six of them were labelled as studying the totality of the control room. 
However, one of the studies was excluded here since its purpose was to investigate 
human error probabilities for the purpose of developing Human Reliability Analysis 
methods, not to evaluate the control room. In the studies, a number of di$ erent 
measures were used to assess the control room design. Savioja (2014) summarises 
them into the following categories: plant performance; task performance (time); 
task performance (errors); situation awareness; workload/task load; teamwork 
and communication; anthropometric measures; physiological measures; usability; 
expert opinion concerning error probability; and expert opinion concerning safety 
(Table 6). # e most popular categories of measures in the reviewed studies were 
task performance (errors), situation awareness, workload/task load, and teamwork 
and communication. # e expert opinion in the study by Hwang et al. (2009) was 
collected by prompting the operators to discuss design of interface, utilization of 
procedures, task processes, members’ communication, situation awareness, source 
of information, and mental workload from the point of view of error probabilities 
and errors that had occurred during the operators’ training period. # e expert 
opinion concerning safety in the study by Luquetti dos Santos et al. (2009) stems 
from a questionnaire where each feature of the control desk related to the panel 
CHAPTER  5
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layout, panel label, information display, controls and alarms, was rated according 
to its conformance to a certain human factors guideline and weight of importance.
An interesting issue is the reasoning behind the choice of measures in the studies 
reviewed by Savioja (2014). Two studies (Ha et al. and Luquetti dos Santos et 
al.) based their choice of measures on guidance documents from the United 
States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (1997, 2002, 2012). # e human factors 
engineering program review model NUREG-0711 (United States Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, 2012) and the more detailed integrated system validation 
document NUREG/CR-6393 (United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
1997) proposes the following categories of measures: plant performance; 
primary and secondary task performance; situation awareness; workload; and 
anthropometry and physiology. In NUREG/CR-6393, each of the categories is 
described in the context of its connection to the control room system’s support of 
safe operation. NUREG-0700 (United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
2002) contains human-system interface design review guidelines.
Gatto et al. (2013) used operating time to assess the physical layout of the control 
room since the location of adequate interfaces was considered crucial for promptly 
identifying abnormalities and responding appropriately. Hwang et al. (2009) and 
Chuang and Chou (2008) provide no clear reasoning behind their choice of 
measures. Table 6 summarises the studies in terms of the measures that were used 
and the source of or reasoning behind these measures.
In addition to the studies in the literature review by Savioja (2014), a search was 
conducted for additional control room evaluation studies in academic literature. 
Preparation (i.e. not yet empirically tested) for an integrated system validation 
of a nuclear power plant control room by Li et al. (2012) was identi" ed in this 
search. # e rationale for the selection of measures was not explicitly stated, but 
the process used is described as corresponding to the elements in the human 
factors engineering program review model NUREG-0711 (United States Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, 2012). # e same argument is made in a paper by Liu et 
al. (2012), although the measures taken are slightly di$ erent. Table 7 presents a 
summary of these studies.
# ese examples show that a range of measures are used in empirical control room 
evaluations. All but one of the categories of measures presented in section 4.3 
are represented. # e plant performance, task performance, and teamwork and 
communication measures categories of Savioja (2014) correspond well to the system 
performance, task performance, and teamwork measures categories in section 4.3. 
Situation awareness and workload/task load can be accommodated within the use 
of resources category. Anthropometric and physiological measures as they were 
used by Ha et al. (2007) and Li et al. (2012) " t into the identi" cation of design 
discrepancies category. # e usability measures used by Chuang and Chou (2008) 
and Li et al. (2012) are not adequately detailed in their papers, but seems to be 
measures belonging to the identi" cation of design discrepancies category as well. 
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# e measure ‘expert opinion concerning error probability’ by Hwang et al. (2009) 
corresponds to the task performance category. Lastly, the measure ‘expert opinion 
concerning safety’ is very general and its rationale for belonging to a category 
depends on the use of the measure in the study in question. # e way Luquetti 
dos Santos et al. (2009) use this measure makes it a part of the identi" cation of 
design discrepancies category. # e only category of measures from section 4.3 not 
utilised in the reviewed evaluations was user experience.
As described above, the rationale behind the choice of evaluation measures in 
the reviewed studies was not always clear. Several of the studies used guidance 
documents from the United States Regulatory Commission as a reference, which 
in turn motivates its categories of evaluation measures with their connection to 
the control room system’s support of safe operation. It is worth noting here that 
the documents NUREG/CR-6393 and NUREG-0711 (United States Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, 1997, 2012) do not speci" cally mention teamwork as a 
performance measure, although this was assessed in the studies referring to them.
5.2 FRAMEWORKS FOR SELECTION OF EVALUATION MEASURES
As was seen in the review of empirical control room evaluations in section 5.1, 
systematic operationalisation of the control room’s system purpose as a basis for 
determining evaluation criteria is not always undertaken. To support this activity, 
researchers have developed frameworks to guide the selection of evaluation 
measures for control rooms. # is section presents two such frameworks. # ese two 
frameworks have been developed in the context of nuclear power plant control 
room evaluation, which is the reason for their inclusion in this licentiate thesis.
When discussing reviewed empirical control room evaluations, Savioja (2014) 
concluded that the evaluation methodologies used tend to simplify and generalise 
the operating work, which may weaken the relevance of the results of these 
evaluations. She continued by stating that “In a control room study, the evaluation 
framework should preferably be such that the complexities of everyday work of operating 
crews in NPPs can also be addressed” (Savioja, 2014, p. 53). In response to this, she 
presents an evaluation methodology to assess systems usability in control rooms. 
# e methodology is based on activity theory, and its framework is meant to be 
a conceptual tool that aids in " nding relevant measures for a comprehensive 
evaluation of systems usability in the control room. # e scope of the research covers 
only empirical user tests assessing use of the system. Systems usability is described 
as the capability of the technology to ful" l the instrumental, psychological, and 
communicative functions of the tool in the activity, and to support the ful" lment 
of core-task demands in the work. # e instrumental function regards the tool’s 
ability to bring about the desired e$ ect on the plant’s process. # e psychological 
function is the tool’s ability to enable psychological processes and provide the 
operators with external means to control their own behaviour. # e communicative 
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function is the social aspects of using the tool, the role of the community that 
uses the tool for the same activity. Core-task demands are demands of the main 
content of the work that relate to the actors’ skills, knowledge, and collaboration.
Savioja (2014) states that systems usability is evidenced in technology usage in 
the appropriate performance outcome, way of acting and user experience. To 
assess only  performance outcome is not deemed su=  cient since the multitude 
of barriers (technical, organisational etc.) in complex socio-technical systems are 
designed to neutralise the e$ ect of performance variance on the outcome, which 
means that the performance outcome measure will not be sensitive enough to 
assess variation in the tools (i.e. design changes in the control room). # erefore, 
the more indirect measure ‘way of acting’ must also be evaluated. # e methodology 
also assesses the concept of user experience. # is is motivated by the di=  culty of 
analytically understanding all possible implications the tool (the control room) 
will have on the activity, thus making the utilisation of professional operators’ 
experiences important. In addition, Savioja (2014) refers to the view of Kaptelinin 
and Nardi (2012), who state that the user’s emotions are indicators of the status 
of the activity as a whole. It is also stated that user experience is an indication 
concerning the development potential of the tool. User experience is de" ned as 
“the users’ subjective feeling of the appropriateness of the proposed tool for the activity” 
(Savioja et al., 2014, p. 429). Savioja (2014) states that the overbearing quality 
of user experience is that the user feels that the technology has the potential 
to develop into a meaningful tool for the activity and bene" ts interaction with 
the object of the activity. In short, the methodology evaluates the concept of 
systems usability by assessing the instrumental, psychological and communicative 
functions of a tool from the di$ erent perspectives of performance, way of acting 
and user experience. Figure 2 shows an example of how the framework has been 
used to identify measures.
Another example of a framework to support the development of evaluation 
criteria is suggested by Braarud and Rø Eitrheim (2013). # ey state that “current 
models of control room work lack integrated descriptions that consider both the physical 
representations, couplings to cognitive support, discrimination between individual and 
team demands, and relation to the current situation and process state” (Braarud and 
Rø Eitrheim, 2013, p. 17). Because of this, they suggest a framework with a model 
that covers the control room functionalities, possible physical representations 
and support for safe and e$ ective performance of the tasks by the team. It is 
meant to be used as a basis for a criterion-referenced validation of the control 
room system. A criterion-referenced approached is described as sharing elements 
with the requirement and expert judgement-based determination of acceptance 
criteria by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (2012) described 
in section 4.3. # e di$ erence is said to be that the criterion-referenced approach 
does not necessarily need to be based on a formal engineering analysis. However, 
the authors state that the framework in its current state could equally well be 
used as a basis for improvements of the benchmark approach or other approaches 
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to determining acceptance criteria. # e framework focuses on phenomena that 
can be observed in performance based testing. # e purpose of the framework 
is to guide the categories and dimensions for which to develop evaluation and 
acceptance criteria.
# e model in their framework consists of four main parts: team, cognitive 
dimensions, tools, and situation (see Figure 3). # e team are the ‘agents’ interacting 
directly with the plant process. Cognitive dimensions contain characteristics of 
how process control is performed by the agents. # e team cognition part consider 
characteristics of how interaction between team members is performed, the other 
three cognitive dimensions parts mainly regard work more directly connected to 
controlling the process. # e inner levels of the situation understanding, mission, and 
control and validation parts are organised according to an abstraction hierarchy. 
To be able to perform process control, the agents need means and support, the 
tools. Situation is the setting and the plant process, including the initiation of and 
outcome of the agents’ process control.
# e framework by Braarud and Rø Eitrheim (2013) is still under development. 
# e forming of the current version was focused on the theoretical background and 
the main elements of the framework. # e development of performance criteria, 
measurements and observational techniques for evaluation purposes will be part 
of the authors’ future work.
# e framework of Savioja (2014) includes measures from all the categories 
presented in section 4.3, with the exception of the identi" cation of design 
discrepancies category. Instrumental performance correspond to the system and 
task performance categories. # e latter also cover instrumental way of acting. 
Psychological performance and way of acting relate to measures within the 
use of resources category. # e teamwork category cover measures for all three 
perspectives of the communicative function. Lastly, the user experience category of 
measures corresponds to all three functions within the user experience perspective 
of Savioja. # e framework of Braarud and Rø Eitrheim (2013) clearly emphasises 
the importance of the teamwork category by including the team cognition part 
in their model. # e description of the cognitive dimensions suggests that it is 
important to evaluate system performance, task performance, and use of resources. 
However, this framework does not propose measures as clearly as Savioja’s, nor is 
it possible to map its contents as directly to the categories of measures.
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5.3 PAPER I – SAFE OPERATION ASPECTS IN SWEDISH NUCLEAR POWER 
PLANTS
# is section summarises the result of Study I (described in section 2.1). # e aim 
of Study I was to " nd aspects of the control room system that contribute to safe 
operation from a human factors perspective, to be able to identify a foundation for 
evaluation measures. # e study in its totality is described in Paper I.
# e data from the interviews in Study I was organised into " ve overall themes: 
situations, functions, tasks, characteristics and structural elements. # e situations 
theme consisted of states in which the control room system may be in and events 
in the environment surrounding the control room system. # ese are situations 
that the control room system must be able to handle, such as di$ erent operational 
modes (startup, power operation, shutdown, and outage) and di$ erent types of 
disturbances. Functions were the abilities the control room system must have, 
the abstract capabilities of the control room system that are realised by the 
control room system design. Examples of functions stated were: presentation of 
information; having established codes of conduct (rules); and having a distribution 
of responsibility (roles). Tasks were what the control room system, either its 
operators or technical systems, must be able to perform. Tasks could be both ‘as 
imagined’ (such as actions described in procedures) and ‘as done’ (what the operators 
actually do), and were divided into: primary tasks (those directly connected to 
supervising and controlling the plant’s process), way of working, communication, 
and cooperation. Structural elements were the physical or social entities that 
realise the control room system. # e statements of the structural elements theme 
were categorised into " ve sub-themes: operator interfaces; physical control room 
design; process and instrumentation and control (I&C) systems; support systems; 
and personnel. Support systems were for example procedures and routines. Finally, 
characteristics were conditions establishing how artefacts should be designed and 
how personnel should be and behave. Characteristics of the design included traits 
such as clarity, consistency, and error tolerance. Characteristics of the operators 
were for example competence (especially understanding the plant and its process), 
curiosity, and 8 exibility. Further description of the contents of the themes is found 
in Paper I.
# e interviewees’ prioritisation between aspects that contributed to safe operation 
di$ ered. Apart from aspects concerning plant status (overview, understanding, and 
the operator interface presenting it), which was stated by many as contributing 
most, the interviewees’ answers had little in common. Neither were they in 
agreement on which aspects contributed least to safe operation.
# e results of Study I are largely con" rmed by the framework by Braarud and Rø 
Eitrheim (2013). # e team and tool categories of their model describe the same 
entities that were included in the structural elements theme in Study I (the only 
exception being that the structural element of process and I&C systems is not as 
emphasised in the Braarud and Rø Eitrheim framework). Furthermore, the team 
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category consists of subgroups according to the functionality of the tools, which 
mirrors some of the functions noted in Study I. Situations for which the control 
room system should be designed and used are present in both the Study I themes 
and the Braarud and Rø Eitrheim framework. # e cognitive dimensions of the 
model details functions and tasks stated in Study I.
# e framework by Savioja (2014) also con" rms parts of Study I. # e user experience 
perspective on activity strongly emphasised by Savioja was mentioned by the 
interviewees in Study I. # e way of acting perspective in Savioja’s framework 
supports the interviewees’ statements regarding the importance of the way of 
working in Study I. # e emphasis on the importance of communication and 
cooperation in Study I is mirrored in the communicative function of the tool in 
Savioja’s framework.
Assessing the aspects contributing to safe operation resulting from Study I would 
require measures from the categories of system performance, task performance, 
teamwork, use of resources, and identi" cation of design discrepancies. # e user 
experience perspective was mentioned, but not emphasised.
5.4 PAPER II – TRENDS IN CONTROL ROOM SYSTEM DESIGN
# e study by Osvalder and Alm (2012) initiating the work in this doctoral project 
questioned whether methods used today are generally adapted to conditions in 
traditional control rooms and not suitably adapted to changes in modernised and 
future control rooms. Study II (2.2) was conducted to explore possible usability 
problems that it is important to attend to in the design of future Swedish nuclear 
power control room systems and suggest requirements that human factors 
evaluation methods must ful" l. # e control room system design trends that were 
identi" ed in Study II (and presented in Paper II) were:
• More software based presentation
• Variety in operator interfaces
• Centralisation of information
• Increase in level of automation
• Addition of new process systems or functions
• Implementation of digital operating procedures
• Increase in turnover of personnel
An increase in software based presentation was also identi" ed at the previously 
mentioned workshop organised by a Nuclear Energy Agency committee (OECD/
NEA Committee on Safety of Nuclear Installations, 2005), where it was also 
concluded that access to operator interfaces are becoming more serial. # e latter 
is known as the keyhole e$ ect and was also noted by Carvalho et al. (2008) as one 
of the most important consequences of a transition from the traditional analogue 
instrumentation and control technology to digital technology. # e keyhole e$ ect 
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is a consequence of the smaller space for presentation of information that a normal 
computer screen provides, and information must be used in a sequential manner 
as opposed to parallel access as is possible with analogue control panels. 
# e OECD/NEA Committee on Safety of Nuclear Installations (2005) also 
concluded that interactions are increasingly conducted through computer systems 
as opposed to through crew interaction with plant systems and components. # is 
" nding can be connected to the trend of information centralisation, to locate even 
more supervision and control to the main control room, identi" ed in Study II. # e 
OECD/NEA workshop also noted that the functionality of operator interfaces is 
being expanded, something that also was concluded in Study II.
As a consequence of these control room system design trends, Study II suggested 
a number of demands on human factors evaluation methods. # e correspondence 
between these and the categories of evaluation measures from section 4.3 is shown 
in Table 8.
Two of the requirements from Study II, identi" cation of usability problems 
connected to automation and evaluation of digital operating procedures, point to 
more complex problems that cannot be assessed by single categories of evaluation 
measures. As in the case with larger complex socio-technical systems, such as 
control room systems, they require the use of measures from several categories. For 
example, this was the case in two evaluation studies of computer-based operating 
procedures by Le Blanc and Oxstrand (2013).
5.5 PAPER III – THE RESILIENCE ENGINEERING PERSPECTIVE
As was described in section 3.2, resilience engineering has been proposed as an 
approach that complements the traditional view of safety to increase safety in 
socio-technical systems. However, this is not an approach that is used in the 
empirical control room system evaluations reviewed in section 5.1. Both Savioja 
(2014) and Braarud and Rø Eitrheim (2013) on the other side, acknowledge the 
importance of the resilience perspective when evaluating safety in complex socio-
technical systems. Savioja (2014) inparticular points out how evaluating the way 
of acting and user experience are methods of assessing a system’s potential for 
resilient performance.
Another way of assessing a system’s potential for resilient performance is the 
Resilience Assessment Grid, abbreviated RAG (Hollnagel, 2011a). RAG is a 
question based tool that support resilience management by assessing four basic 
abilities of a system. # e four basic abilities that make resilient performance 
possible, proposed by Hollnagel (2011b) and also known as the cornerstones of 
resilience, are: respond, monitor, anticipate, and learn. Respond is the ability to 
know what to do, i.e. how to respond to expected and unexpected events using 
pre-de" ned responses or by adjusting the system’s normal functioning.  Monitor 
is to know what to look for, i.e. that which is or can be a threat in the near future. 
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TABLE 8: Correspondence between demands on human factors methods from Study II and 
categories of evaluation measures from section 4.3
Demands on human factors methods 
from Study II, they must be able to:
Corresponding category of evaluation 
measures from section 4.3
Identify inconsistencies between 
operator interfaces, both in appearance 
and interaction
Identi! cation of design discrepancies
Identify work tasks that create extreme 
levels of mental workload
Use of resources
Identify ine#  cient work tasks Task performance
Identify con$ icting work tasks Task performance
Identify information and control devices 
necessary for di" erent work tasks and 
users with various experience levels
Task performance
Identify usability problems connected to 
the level of automation and presentation 
of system automation
Would require a combination of 
measures from several categories
Identify inconsistencies between the 
operators’ mental models of the system 
and the system itself
Task performance, use of resources
Evaluate situation awareness (both 
collective and individual) and identify 
potential usability problems that might 
decrease awareness of the status of the 
process
Use of resources
Evaluate operator workload to identify 
related potential usability problems
Use of resources
Evaluate cooperation within the shift 
team to identify related potential 
usability problems
Teamwork
Evaluate the design and use of digital 
operating procedures to identify 
potential usability problems
Would require a combination of 
measures from several categories
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Anticipate is to know what to expect, i.e. to anticipate future changes and their 
consequences. Learn is to know what has happened and to learn the right lesson 
from experiences of successes and failures alike. According to Hollnagel (2011a), 
the " rst step when applying RAG is to de" ne and describe the system to be 
assessed. # e second step is to develop a set of questions for each of the four basic 
abilities. Persons with experience of the domain in question are then asked to rate 
the answer to each question, providing the assessment of the system’s potential for 
resilient performance.
Paper III present a study whose purpose was to explore how concrete aspects of 
the nuclear power plant control room system can be connected to the four basic 
abilities of resilient performance. In particular, it shows how aspects contributing 
to safe operation from Study I (functions, structural elements, and characteristics) 
can be used to make this connection. Examples of this, based on statements from 
Study I, are shown in Figure 4.
One requirement when applying RAG is to de" ne and describe the system to be 
assessed to be able to develop a suitable set of questions for each cornerstone. # e 
results of Paper III can be used as a foundation when preparing RAG questions 
for a nuclear power plant control room system. Paper III showed how known 
aspects of control room system design contributing to safe operation can be 
viewed in the light of their contribution to resilient behaviour. # e functions, 
characteristics, and structural elements themes have the potential to describe the 
nature of concrete aspects of control room system design and to connect them to 
the four basic resilient abilities respond, monitor, anticipate, and learn.
Figure 4: Examples showing how concrete aspects of the control room system (functions, structural ele-
ments, and characteristics) can be connected to the cornerstones of resilience.
Functions
− the abilities the control room system must have
Cornerstones of resilience
Respond
− to know what to do, i.e. how to respond to expected
and unexpected events using pre-de"ned responses 
or by adjusting the system's normal functioning
Monitor
− to know what to look for, i.e. to monitor that which is or
can be threats in the near future
Anticipate
− to know what to expect, i.e. to anticipate future
changes and their consequences
Learn
− to know what has happened and to learn the right
lesson from experiences of successes and failures alike
Choose appropriate responses to events
Guide pre-de"ned responses
Monitor the status of plant
Provide information about the status of the plant
Cope with large amounts of information
Discover gradual degradations early
Anticipate future events
Present values of process parameters over time
Acquire experience-based knowledge
Learn from past events
Exam
ples
Exampl
es
Examples
Examples
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Struc
tural 
elem
ents
− the
 entit
ies th
at con
stitut
e the
 cont
rol ro
om sy
stem
Characteristics
− establish conditions for the design of artefacts as 
well as the behaviours and abilities of personnel
Routines for communicating the status of the plant to the rest of the shift team
Contro
l room 
person
nel
Procedures/do
cumentation
Control room personnel
Control room personnel
Control room personnel
Routines for communicating plans for actions and anticipated consequences
Routines for formal experience feedback
User interface
User interface: trend curves, alarms for derivatives
Knowledge of:
− The design of the nuclear power plant
− How to operate the plant
− How to perform secondary tasks
Knowledge of:
− The design of the nuclear power plant
− What to monitor in a given situation
− Where information is presented
− What the interface should look like
− When not to trust information
− How to "nd alternative information
− What is going on in the plant
− Available
− Easy to identify correct procedure/documentation
− Easy to "nd and interpret information
[No characteristics stated in the interviews]
− Show the right amount of information
− Show priority of information
− Ease pattern recognition
Attitudes: curiosity, stubbornness
Attitude: desire to continuously learn
Draw experience from relevant events
[No characteristics stated in the interviews]
[No characteristics stated in the interviews]
Procedures/documentation
Routines        
Personnel
Control room design
5.6 CONCLUDING EVALUATION MEASURES
# is section presents conclusions regarding which measures should be used 
to evaluate control room systems, based on the contents of sections 5.1 to 5.5. 
Speci" cally, which of the categories of evaluation measures presented in section 
4.3 are suitable for nuclear power plant control room systems.
System and task performance of some kind were used as measures in several of the 
reviewed empirical control room evaluations (section 5.1), and they are supported 
by the frameworks of Savioja (2014) and Braarud and Rø Eitrheim (2013). # e 
aspects contributing to safe operation proposed by the interviewees in Study I 
also suggest that system and task performance are relevant measures for nuclear 
power plant control rooms. In addition, task performance would be useful for 
assessing future nuclear power plant control room systems, according to Study II.
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Teamwork and use of resources were also assessed in several of the reviewed 
evaluations in section 5.1, as well as being supported by Savioja (2014) and 
Braarud and Rø Eitrheim (2013). # e communication and cooperation aspects 
of teamwork were heavily emphasised by the interviewees in Studies I and II. # e 
interviewees also often regarded use of resources in terms of situation awareness 
and to some extent workload.
User experience was not measured in any of the reviewed empirical control room 
evaluations (section 5.1), it was mentioned but not emphasised in Study I, and it 
was not identi" ed as an important measure category in Study II. # e contents of 
the model by Braarud and Rø Eitrheim (2013) do not speci" cally suggest that it 
is important to evaluate user experience. However, measuring user experience is a 
very important part of Savioja’s (2014) framework. She argues that the di=  culty of 
analytically fully understanding the e$ ect the tool will have on the activity makes 
utilisation of the operators’ experiences important. Furthermore, she proposes 
that user experience measures are useful for evaluation of early design concepts. 
Less mature designs might be di=  cult to assess through the use of performance 
measures (such as time and errors), but the expert users’ intuitive feeling of the 
tool’s appropriateness may be useful in this phase.
# e category identi" cation of design discrepancies has a somewhat di$ erent focus 
that the other categories. It focuses on the design of the artefacts rather than the 
use and user of the system. Measures falling into the identi" cation of design 
discrepancies category were utilised in four of the reviewed evaluations in section 
5.1. Many aspects from Study I, especially those belonging to the characteristics 
theme, would also be suitable to assess using this category. In addition, Study II 
showed the category to be useful when evaluating future nuclear power plant 
control room systems. Neither Savioja (2014) nor Braarud and Rø Eitrheim 
(2013), however, include measures from this category in their frameworks. One 
concluding question is whether measures in this category are redundant. As was 
stated in section 4.3, an advantage of the identi" cation of design discrepancies 
category is that it provides information regarding the nature of a problem, not 
only that there is a problem. As such, it serves as a very useful complement to other 
measures, especially in formative evaluations. # is view is seemingly shared by 
the NUREG/CR-6393 and NUREG-0711 documents (United States Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, 1997, 2012).# e list of suggested measures in these 
documents focuses both on use and user (plant performance, task performance, 
situation awareness, and workload) as well as on the artefact (anthropometric 
and physiological factors), the latter measures belonging to the identi" cation of 
design discrepancies category.
To conclude, system performance, task performance, teamwork, and use of 
resources are widely used and proposed categories of measures for control room 
system evaluations. System performance is a category of measures closely related 
to system goals. Assessing the system’s performance can be seen as the lower level 
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of acceptance – if this is not met, there is little point in assessing aspects from other 
categories to determine if the design is su=  cient. Task performance, teamwork, 
and use of resources has the advantage of being more sensitive to variations in 
performance than measures in the system performance category. For example, 
experienced operators might be able to keep plant parameters within their limits, 
but discrepancies in their task performance can indicate where a less experienced 
operator would have problems handling the situation. # e task performance, 
teamwork, and use of resources categories all assess unique aspects of performance 
variation and should all be included in control room system evaluations. # e user 
experience category has the advantage of utilising the subjective experience of 
the operators as well as being less dependent on actual performance. # e former 
adds a valuable perspective to the evaluation, and the latter makes the category 
useful for less mature design concepts. # e last category, identi" cation of design 
discrepancies, might not necessarily " nd unique problems that are impossible 
to " nd using the other categories. However, this category has the advantage of 
providing information more easily converted into design changes that need to be 
implemented. For formative evaluations, with the purpose of identifying ways to 
improve the design, this is a valuable characteristic.
As for the resilience perspective, it is a view of safety that has the potential to 
increase safety in ways that are unobtainable using the traditional view of safety. 
Having said that, the potential for resilient performance of a system is a systemic 
aspect, and is not something that is possible to contain in a single measure. 
Savioja (2014) describes how aspects of resilient performance are covered by her 
framework, and the Resilience Assessment Grid tool in combination with the 
results of Paper III o$ ers another way to assess a nuclear power plant control 
room system from the resilience perspective.
# e conclusion of chapter 5 is that all categories of evaluation measures presented 
in section 4.3 are relevant for evaluating nuclear power plant control room 
systems. In addition, adopting the resilience perspective in the evaluation has the 
potential to further prepare the nuclear power plant control room system for the 
unexpected.
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DISCUSSION
# e contents of this licentiate thesis have contributed to the purpose of the overall 
research project in that it has improved and further developed the knowledge 
of methods for evaluation of modi" ed and newly designed control rooms. # is 
contribution is shown here by presenting how the present work answers research 
question 1 and 2a.
Research question 1 (RQ1) is about " nding the aspects that must be evaluated 
to assess the control room system’s ability to support safe operation of the plant. 
# e aspects identi" ed are six categories of measures: system performance, task 
performance, teamwork, use of resources, user experience, and identi" cation 
of design discrepancies. # ese di$ erent categories of measures each contribute 
di$ erently to the assessment of the control room system. # e identi" cation of 
design discrepancies category di$ ers from the others in that it may not necessarily 
identify unique problems. However, this category is useful in formative evaluations 
since it provides better information on how identi" ed problems may be solved.
Another " nding connected to RQ1 is application of the resilience engineering 
perspective to safety when evaluating control room systems. # is is a valuable 
complement when assessing complex socio-technical systems where all future 
events cannot possibly be predicted. # e framework of Savioja (2014) claims to 
consider the resilience engineering perspective through its focus on user experience 
and way of acting. However, it was developed for use in empirical control room 
system evaluations and not for analytical evaluations. An alternate path might be 
to explore analytical methods that evaluate the perspectives in Savioja’s framework 
which examine resilience engineering. # is would primarily encompass methods 
that evaluate user experience and task performance (the latter being the category 
of measures closest to ‘way of acting’). # e Resilience Assessment Grid (RAG) is 
an analytical method whose measures fall into di$ erent categories depending on 
the questions asked. # e cornerstones of resilience consist of abilities desirable in 
the control room system, and using RAG is a way of determining if the system 
design supports them. In particular, using the result of Paper III as a foundation, 
RAG can be used to assess if a nuclear power plant control room system support 
these abilities. However, resilience engineering is still a relatively new " eld of 
research. # e cornerstones of resilience encompass one set of abilities believed to 
be important for resilient behaviour, although other paths should also be sought.
# is licentiate thesis also aimed at answering research question 2a (RQ2a) 
– to " nd the characteristics required of evaluation methods. One identi" ed 
requirement is that evaluation methods for early evaluation must allow the use 
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of more conceptual system representations. # is requirement makes analytical 
evaluation methods that utilise indirect studies of use more suitable for early 
evaluation. An initial review of existing evaluation methods was performed, and 
it indicated that there are many methods suited for direct studies of use, but 
fewer analytical methods (see section 4.3). For some of the identi" ed categories 
of measures no analytical evaluation methods were found. For user experience 
measures, Savioja et al. (2014) explain this lack of proven evaluation methods by 
the fact that user experience has most often been investigated in the context of 
consumer products and applications. As a result, the number of methods suitable 
for safety-critical work systems such as nuclear power plant control rooms is 
low. Apart from conducting a more thorough search for methods, it would be 
interesting to investigate further if empirical evaluation methods can be modi" ed 
to suit indirect studies of use as well. A natural " rst step would be to explore if 
existing empirical methods can be used for imagined use rather than actual use. 
For example, walk- and talk-throughs are two approaches using this principle, 
making them suitable for more conceptual system representations.
A development process might look linear on paper, but is seldom strictly so in 
reality. However, design decisions higher up the abstraction hierarchy are usually 
" nalised before a design decision at lower levels. Even though the detailed design 
of speci" c components might need to be discussed to be able to reach a conclusion 
on more overall functions, design decisions often need to be " nalised from the 
higher abstraction levels and down. # is means that the design of higher-level 
functions of the control room systems are normally decided before detailed 
interface design is developed, and can be evaluated earlier. Evaluation methods 
focused on evaluating functions rather than actual realisations of functions might 
thus be better suited for early evaluation. # is is yet another topic that will be 
further investigated in future work within this doctoral project.
Many of the identi" ed categories of measures are performance-related. An 
issue worth investigating further is whether or not performance measures are 
even possible to evaluate using indirect studies of work. Can imagined use or 
other approaches say something meaningful about measures closely related to 
performance? Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) methods are widely used 
techniques for predictively assessing task performance. Retrospective methods 
for assessing mental workload, such as SWAT, Subjective Workload Assessment 
Technique (Reid et al., 1981, Reid and Nygren, 1988), and SWORD, Subjective 
Workload Dominance Technique (Vidulich, 1989), exist in predictive versions 
as well; PRO-SWAT (Eggleston, 1984, Reid and Shingledecker, 1984) and 
PRO-SWORD (Vidulich et al., 1991). Analytical methods for evaluating task 
performance and use of resources evidently exist today, implying that methods for 
indirect studies of use might be possible for other performance-related measures 
as well.
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Required evaluation method characteristics do not only stem from what they 
must be able to evaluate, but also from how useable they must be. In the study 
initiating this doctoral project Osvalder and Alm (2012) highlight the fact that 
methods need to be 8 exible and simple to use. Waterson et al. (2015) examined 
current sociotechnical methods and assessed their suitability from a theoretical and 
practical standpoint. One of the identi" ed issues was that many methods “proved to 
be di$  cult to use, time consuming and require a lot of training” (Waterson et al., 2015, 
p. 7). # is need for usability in human factors methods is in agreement with the 
author’s own practical experience. To identify requirements on industrially viable 
human factors engineering methods, Andersson and Osvalder (2015) interviewed 
human factors engineers to investigate the extent to which existing human factors 
engineering methods match practitioners’ needs in industrial contexts. Nine 
requirements or features were found for a human factors engineering method 
to be useful in practice, namely that the method should: be tweakable to " t the 
working context, be systematic, be inspiring and fun to use, be adaptable for use 
in multidisciplinary teams, work for varying levels of ambition, be transparent for 
all stakeholders, be explicit in how to use it, support measurability, and " t into the 
development process.
# e scope of the present work has been limited to the nuclear power plant control 
room system. # ere may however be parts of the plant’s process whose control is 
not centralised. Locally placed control interfaces might therefore exist in addition 
to the central control room. In recent years the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority 
has strived to widen the human factors focus for modi" cations in Swedish nuclear 
power plants, from only concerning the central control room to including control 
interfaces in other parts of the plant as well. Locally placed control interfaces in 
a nuclear power plant have the same overall purpose as the centralised control 
room system, namely safe operation. # e main di$ erence between the two lies in 
the locally placed control interface not being continuously manned. Furthermore, 
they di$ er in scope, both the scope of what is being controlled and also the scope 
of the physical and organisational structural elements that constitute them. # ese 
di$ erences will a$ ect the scope of the evaluation being undertaken, but not 
the categories of measures relevant to use. # e only di$ erence is the teamwork 
category. If a local control interface is always operated by a single operator, and if 
this operator does not need to communicate with other operators, then teamwork 
evaluation is not relevant. # ere are also, of course, control room systems that 
do not control a process in the same way as a nuclear power plant. One such 
example is the nuclear security control room, responsible for monitoring the 
nuclear power plant for malicious acts such as sabotage and unauthorised access, 
and coordinating responses to such events. For control rooms or locally placed 
control interfaces not controlling a process, the purpose might be di$ erent from 
that of the nuclear power plant control room system. # e categories of measures 
will still be relevant, but the exact measures to be used in the evaluation must be 
operationalised from the purpose of the system in question.
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# e focus of the overall doctoral project was on methods for evaluating safe 
operation. Consequently the aim of Study I was to " nd aspects of the control room 
system that contribute to safe operation from a human factors perspective. When 
planning the study safe operation was seen as a performance and safety issue. 
Apart from the aspects contributing to safe operation, an additional conclusion of 
Paper I was that operator well-being should be regarded as a goal for control room 
systems in addition to safe operation. While a positive user experience certainly 
contributes to performance, operator well-being also has a value of its own. # is 
is also an additional argument for using the user experience category of measures 
when evaluating control room systems. Another issue to discuss with regard to 
the goal for the control room system is to avoid " nancial damage, for example 
through damage to equipment. # e de" nitions of the term safe operation proposed 
in section 3.2 (from a Safety-I and a Safety-II perspective) both emphasise the 
production of electricity. Production of electricity naturally requires undamaged 
and functioning equipment. While damage to equipment will involve " nancial 
costs in addition to the costs of lost production, the goal of the nuclear power 
plant control room system remains the same. Striving to uphold safe operation 
will mean avoiding damage to equipment regardless of the purpose.
# e studies performed and included in the present work were interview studies. 
Study I sought aspects that contribute to safe operation and Study II explored 
future nuclear power plant control room trends and usability problems that 
these trends may promote. # e statements given by the interviewees in Study 
I are subjective. # eir knowledge and education may be grounded in objective 
studies of what makes the nuclear power plant control room better suited for safe 
operation. # is foundation for their knowledge can however not be guaranteed. 
# eir experience, on the other hand, is " rst-hand and should be regarded as a 
source of knowledge in its own right. In addition, the results of Study I do not 
contradict the measures used in the empirical control room system evaluations 
reviewed in section 5.1. Nor do they contradict the contents of the frameworks 
for selection of evaluation measures presented in section 5.2. # e results of Study 
I are thus considered trustworthy. As for the results of Study II, the short-term 
control room system modi" cation trends were based on the plant owners’ actual 
plans for future changes and can thus be considered sound. # e long-term trends 
were based on the interviewees’ own predictions and may thus not be as reliable. 
However, the possible usability problems and required categories of measures 
connected to these long-term trends did not di$ er from the ones connected to 
the short-term trends. # erefore, this lesser reliability is of little importance.
# e contents of this licentiate thesis have contributed to the purpose of the overall 
research project through contribution to ful" lment of the " rst and third goals. 
# e identi" ed categories of measures can be used in reviews of the plant owners’ 
evaluations. # e present work thus contributes to the " rst goal, to provide the 
Swedish Radiation Safety Authority with knowledge, methods and guidelines to 
support them in their supervisory and licencing role. # e categories of measures 
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identi" ed as relevant for nuclear power plant control room systems also constitute 
useful knowledge for professionals in the domain of planning and executing 
evaluations. # is knowledge, combined with the other required characteristics 
of methods identi" ed here, will be able to further improve methods for early 
evaluation, providing professionals with tools useful in their evaluation work. # e 
present work thus contribute to ful" lment of the third goal as well, to support and 
improve national competence in the domain and academia.
# e second goal of the overall doctoral project is to modify existing and develop 
new methods, guidelines, and principles for evaluation of modi" ed and newly 
designed control rooms for process control, with a focus on safe operation. # is 
goal connects to research question 2b and c (RQ2b and RQ2c): are there suitable 
evaluation methods? If there are no suitable methods, how must existing evaluation 
methods be modi" ed in order to be suitable? # ese questions summarise the 
future work to be done in this doctoral project. # e present work has established 
the requirements, and existing methods " tting these requirements will be sought 
in the continuing work. If no suitable methods are found, these requirements will 
be used to develop new methods. # ese methods will then be tested, preferably 
in real-world projects, to assess whether or not they are able to assess control 
room systems’ ability to support safe operation in early phases of the development 
process.
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CONCLUSIONS
# is licentiate thesis has shown that six di$ erent categories of measures are 
relevant in the evaluation of safe operation in nuclear power plant control room 
systems: system performance, task performance, teamwork, use of resources, user 
experience, and identi" cation of design discrepancies. # e use of a combination 
of measures from the di$ erent categories is necessary in order to fully assess a 
complex socio-technical system such as the control room system.
Apart from using a combination of measures, evaluation of the control room system 
should also consider the resilience engineering perspective. Simply anticipating 
future risks and taking precautions to avoid them will not be enough to pursue 
safe operation for a complex socio-technical system such as a control room system. 
Applying resilience engineering in the design of control room systems will make 
them better suited to handle unanticipated events. In this, evaluation from the 
resilience engineering perspective is important so as to assess whether or not the 
system’s ability for resilient behaviour is su=  cient. Suitable methods for early 
assessment of the capacity for resilient behaviour in control room systems is a 
topic that needs further exploration. # e Resilience Assessment Grid is one such 
method that could be further investigated, together with methods that evaluate 
user experience and task performance.
Apart from investigating categories of measures, this licentiate thesis has also 
explored method characteristics required for early evaluation of control room 
systems. # e usability of methods was one such characteristic; if methods are to be 
utilised and have an actual impact in industry, practitioners must " nd them useful 
in practice. # e other method characteristic for early evaluations identi" ed was 
that system representations in these phases are more conceptual, and that using 
these representations to perform tasks di$ ers in some aspects from use of the " nal 
system. Empirical methods that directly study user interaction with the control 
room system are therefore less suitable for evaluations early in the development 
process. Analytical methods that study use indirectly are a better choice since 
they allow the use of more conceptual system representations. An initial review 
of existing human factors evaluation methods indicates that while empirical 
methods are abundant for all categories of measures, analytical methods are not 
as common. For two of the identi" ed categories of measures, system performance 
and teamwork, no analytical methods were found in this initial search. Methods 
were identi" ed for the other categories of measures, but not in large numbers. 
Further investigating and addressing this gap for control room systems will 
constitute the continuing work in this doctoral project.
CHAPTER  7
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